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Tax Rules for Sourcing Income: 
The Relationship between 
Income Taxes and Trade Taxes 
John Mutti and Harry Grubert 
As multinational corporations play a greater role in global economic activity, 
the incentives such firms face in choosing particular locations for production 
become important determinants of  the geographic-based  measures of  output 
discussed elsewhere in this volume. International trade economists have long 
paid attention to the role of tariffs and other trade taxes on the pattern of trade 
and international investment. This paper assesses how rules for sourcing in- 
come in different locations affect parent income tax liabilities and correspond- 
ingly create incentives to export or to produce abroad. 
From an early postwar perspective,  income taxes were presumed to have 
little influence on the location of real output across countries: a general tax 
imposed on an internationally immobile resource was borne by that factor and 
represented a windfall loss that did not alter the pattern of production.  In a 
world of  increasingly mobile capital and labor, that perspective became less 
warranted. In the  1960s and  1970s academicians  and policymakers  tried to 
assess the influence of home- and host-country tax and tariff rates on the loca- 
tion of production, investment, and trade internationally (see Bergsten, Horst, 
and Moran 1978). 
The current paper pursues a related but less obvious issue, the way that rules 
to determine the source of  income for tax purposes also can have important 
effects on the form in which taxable income is reported and economic activity 
is located. In particular, two issues are evaluated in more detail: the ability to 
regard a portion of export income as foreign source (sales source rules) and 
the treatment of royalties received from abroad as foreign-source income. The 
potential benefits from these source rules have become particularly important 
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due to U.S. tax policy changes adopted in the 1980s and to the growing role of 
US.  production and trade in goods that require intangible intellectual property. 
The U.S. computer software industry provides good examples of the con- 
flicting incentives that exist. Relatively similar transactions can be carried out 
as trade in goods, trade in services, or production by foreign affiliates. How a 
company chooses to structure these often substitutable  transactions  will de- 
pend on several policy measures: host-country tariffs on software imports, for- 
eign income tax rates  and the opportunity  to deduct royalty  payments from 
taxable income, foreign withholding rates on royalties, the way U.S. taxes are 
imposed on foreign-source  income, and the U.S. income tax rate. The incen- 
tives created by these  tax and trade provisions  may result in fundamentally 
similar transactions being characterized quite differently when different indus- 
tries and countries are involved. 
This paper demonstrates several implications of rules that govern whether 
export income, service income,  and royalties  are  regarded  as domestic or 
foreign-source income, a determination relevant in calculating a firm’s foreign 
tax credit position. The relative  significance of these source rules is demon- 
strated in a set of stylized calculations  that show how domestic and foreign 
policies affect a firm’s after-tax returns under various assumptions about the 
importance of tangible  and intangible capital  in production. A brief  section 
considers some related examples and issues that arise as a result of source rules 
applied in foreign countries, which also affect the incentives U.S. firms face. 
The empirical significance of the incentives identified above is treated in the 
final section of the paper. Background information is provided with respect to 
two issues. First, because these incentives apply to active business income but 
not to passive income from portfolio investments, a general overview of U.S. 
income earned abroad is presented. It indicates that the focus on active income 
is not misplaced or directed at an inconsequential  part of U.S. investment activ- 
ity. Second, because the benefits from characterizing income as foreign source 
depend on a firm’s ability to claim credit for foreign taxes paid, the foreign tax 
credit position of U.S. multinational corporations is briefly discussed. Finally, 
work that evaluates  the response  to these  tax incentives is reviewed. While 
such tax benefits might result only in income shifting, with no effect on the 
location of economic activity,  some evidence suggests  that these  provisions 
influence real economic activity as well. 
8.1  Basic Approaches in Taxing Foreign-Source Income 
The United States, together with Japan and the United Kingdom, applies a 
worldwide system that taxes all of the income its residents receive regardless of 
the source of that income across countries. To avoid double taxation of foreign- 
source income, the United States grants a credit for foreign income taxes paid, 
where the credit is limited to the amount of the U.S. tax liability on foreign 
income. The amount of foreign income to declare is defined by U.S. rules, not 
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US.  law provides for an overall foreign tax credit limitation  that does not 
distinguish by country of origin. The foreign tax paid on a dividend received 
from an active business in a high-tax country may offset the U.S. tax due on a 
dividend received from a low-tax country. The United States does, however, 
separate different types of income into different baskets. Interest income re- 
ceived from a tax haven country that imposes a low withholding tax cannot be 
combined with dividends received from a country that imposes a high income 
tax, which otherwise would shield the interest income from U.S. taxation. 
Consider the following example that demonstrates the calculation of a U.S. 
multinational corporation’s foreign tax credit limitation and total tax liability. 
Suppose a firm receives $1,000 of foreign-source income, has paid a foreign 
income tax of $385, and also has domestic-source income of $1,000. Given a 
U.S. income tax rate of 35 percent, the foreign tax credit limitation is $350, 
calculated as the U.S. tax liability on total income (.35 X $2,000) multiplied 
by the share of income that is foreign source (0.5). In this case the firm owes 
no residual U.S. tax on its foreign-source income, has excess foreign tax credits 
of $35, and pays U.S. tax of $350 on its domestic-source income. It pays total 
income taxes of $735. 
If source rules allow the firm to characterize a larger share of its income as 
foreign source, the firm benefits by being able to claim a larger foreign tax 
credit, and it avoids U.S. taxation of that recharacterized income. For example, 
if the firm can treat an additional $100 as foreign-source rather than domestic- 
source income, the foreign tax credit limitation becomes $385. The firm now 
can claim all of the foreign tax paid as a credit against the U.S. tax liability on 
foreign-source  income,  and  its U.S.  liability on domestic-source  income is 
$315. It pays total income taxes of $700, a decline of $35 compared to the 
previous example. 
If the circumstances above are changed so that foreign income taxes paid 
are $285 rather than $385, then the foreign tax limitation remains $350, the 
foreign tax credit is $285, and the residual U.S. tax due is $65. Being able to 
characterize more income as foreign source provides no advantage because a 
residual tax will be due on any additional foreign-source income received by 
this firm, which is in an excess limit position. Therefore, whether a firm has 
excess foreign tax credits is a key factor in determining the effects of source 
rules under the U.S. system of taxing worldwide income. 
8.2  U.S. Rules for Sourcing Income 
The following discussion presents three alternative types of transactions that 
are economically similar but are treated differently under U.S. tax law. The 
three alternatives include the export of a good from the United States, the ex- 
port of a service from the United States, and the transfer of technology to an 
affiliate who provides the good or service in the foreign market. An important 
part  of the difference in tax treatment is attributable to rules that determine 
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as foreign source. The computer software industry is used as a point of refer- 
ence in the discussion because the three different types of transactions all rep- 
resent plausible ways of selling software abroad. The different incentives iden- 
tified, however, apply to other industries as well. 
8.2.1  Exports of Goods 
Begin by considering the exportation of a good from the United States. Sup- 
pose a U.S. company develops a new computer program in the United States 
and exports prepackaged software to foreign users. The profit it earns depends 
on the revenue received from the foreign buyer, Rev,, the tariff rate that must 
be paid to import the good into the foreign market, T,  the variable cost of goods 
sold, Cost, and the U.S. income tax rate imposed on export earnings, t,: 
II  = (1 - tx)[Rev,  /(1 + T) - Cost]. 
To apply this simple framework, assume initially that all capital is equity fi- 
nanced, and ignore the distinction between tangible and intangible assets. 
The U.S. income tax rate may be lower than the rate imposed on domestic 
income if the firm takes advantage of the foreign sales corporation (FSC) pro- 
visions  of the tax code. Under  the combined taxable income administrative 
pricing rule, 15 percent of the corporation’s taxable income from exports sold 
through the FSC is exempt from federal income tax. The exempt income is 
intended to reflect the FSC’s activity abroad in selling the exported goods. An 
alternative approach, the gross receipts method, results in exempt income equal 
to about 1.19 percent of gross receipts. Because the benefit from this latter rule 
declines as the firm’s profit margin increases, firms with profit margins greater 
than 8 percent will find the combined taxable income method more advanta- 
geous. In fact, that is the most commonly selected method, and it is particularly 
relevant for the high-technology examples considered here. In  1987 FSCs re- 
ported gross export receipts of $84.3 billion and net exempt income of $2.1 
billion. The effective tax rate on US.  export income, then, will be lower than 
the statutory corporate tax rate. 
If the U.S. firm is in an excess foreign tax credit position, it may benefit even 
more under provisions of the sales source rules. These rules specify how firms 
are to determine the source of income (domestic or foreign) from the sale of 
inventory property. As shown above, if a firm that has excess credits can declare 
additional foreign-source  income, it can claim a larger foreign tax credit and 
the additional foreign-source income escapes U.S. taxation. 
If  the exported goods are sold through  an FSC and the combined taxable 
income method is used to determine FSC income, generally no more than 25 
percent of the combined taxable income of the FSC and the U.S. exporter can 
be treated as foreign-source income. In combination with the FSC exemption, 
that would allow 40 percent of the firm’s export income to escape U.S. taxation. 
If the goods are not sold through an FSC, however, the firm can often use rules 
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to forgo operating an FSC if they are in an excess credit position, since they 
will gain a larger benefit from the other provisions of the sales source rules. 
The importance of the sales source rules is indicated by the U.S. Department 
of the Treasury  (1992) calculation  that U.S.  firms'  tax liabilities would rise 
$1.8 to $2.1 billion in their absence. A more recent estimate suggests a lower 
tax benefit, roughly half this size (Rousslang  1994). This latter calculation in- 
dicates  that  fewer firms actually  claim 863(b) income on Form  1118 than 
would be predicted on the basis of firms in excess credit positions. 
For those companies that do claim 863(b) income, the benefit from a lower 
U.S. tax rate on export earnings rewards U.S. production. This benefit will be 
more significant the larger the profit margin on goods exported. Conversely, a 
higher foreign tariff rate discourages U.S. production. In the case of computer 
software, tariffs on prepackaged  software range from zero in many countries 
to 85 percent in India. The total value of U.S. merchandise exports reported in 
1993 was $2.3 billion.' 
8.2.2  Exports of Services 
An alternative transaction to consider is the U.S. provision of a service to a 
foreign buyer. In the case of computer software, this item is reported by  the 
Commerce Department as computer and data-processing services, and in 1993 
total sales were $1.8 billion. Such a transaction might involve development of 
a program or analysis carried out in the United States, which is then delivered 
to the foreign customer. The profit the firm earns is represented by the revenue 
it receives from the foreign buyer, the cost of  providing the service, and the 
U.S. tax rate: 
Il  = (1 - tuS)[Rev, - Cost]. 
Several factors distinguish  this case from the exportation  of a good. The 
delivery  of  a  service is not  ordinarily  subject  to a tariff.  The treatment  of 
the income earned by providing the service may be less favorable, however. 
The United States regards such services provided by domestic establishments 
as domestic-source  income and subject to U.S. tax. Exports of software ser- 
vices do not qualify for FSC treatmenCz although exports of master disks could 
benefit from the sales source rules in calculating the foreign tax credit. In gen- 
eral, the relevant U.S. tax rate for providing services will exceed the effective 
rate on income from exports of goods. 
1. This figure recorded under HS 8524905000 includes both prepackaged software valued at the 
price at which it is sold to the foreign buyer and also the value of the medium (tape, disk, etc.) 
used to send software that will require customizing or assistance in installation abroad or to send 
a master disk that will allow foreign reproduction. In the latter two cases the value of the medium 
typically represents a small fraction of the value of the intangible knowledge being transferred. 
2. Architectural and engineering services and export management services qualify for FSC treat- 
ment. Receipts from exports of  patents and other intangibles do not qualify as foreign trade gross 
receipts (U.S. Department of the Treasury 1990,7),  although exports of masters for the distribution 
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8.2.3  Direct Investment Abroad and Affiliate Production 
Suppose a U.S. company develops a new technology in the United States. If 
it licenses the technology for use in the United States (or exploits the technol- 
ogy itself domestically), the royalty payment (additional income) is treated as 
domestic-source  income and is subject to U.S.  tax.  If  instead the company 
licenses the new technology  to  a foreign producer  or produces  abroad in a 
foreign affiliate, the royalty it receives is considered foreign-source in~ome.~ 
The profit the parent firm receives after payment of foreign taxes but before 
the determination  of  any residual  U.S. tax can be represented  in this situa- 
tion as 
Il = (1 - t,)(l - w,)(Rev,  - Cost - R) + (1 - wJR, 
where all profits are repatriated, Rev, represents the revenue that the foreign 
affiliate is receiving in the foreign market, Cost is the variable cost of produc- 
tion in the foreign country, R is the royalty paid to the parent, t, is the foreign 
income tax rate, w, is the dividend withholding rate, and w,  is the royalty with- 
holding rate. Assume statutory and effective tax rates are identical. If the parent 
is in an excess foreign tax credit position and U.S. and foreign rules for defin- 
ing income and allowable expenses are the same, then the foreign tax paid will 
be the final tax burden and no residual U.S. tax is paid. A firm operating in a 
low-tax country does not lose that tax advantage, while a firm operating in a 
high-tax country pays taxes that exceed the comparable burden on domestic- 
source income. 
If the parent firm is in an excess limit position and owes a residual tax to the 
U.S.  government, then the parent’s after-tax income derived from its foreign 
operation is 
n = (1 - t,,)(Rev,  - Cost). 
For a firm operating in a high-tax country, this represents an advantage over 
the situation depicted in the previous paragraph because the higher foreign tax 
burden generates credits that can shield other foreign-source income the parent 
earns. Conversely, if the firm operates in a low-tax country but profits are repa- 
triated when earned, the additional U.S. tax due eliminates the tax advantage 
gained from foreign production in that location. A firm in excess limit, how- 
ever, may have an incentive to pay a lower royalty. That strategy allows it to 
gain the benefits of deferring the U.S. tax liability on the income it earns and 
retains in a low-tax country. The present discussion ignores the opportunity to 
3. This presentation assumes that when the firm transfers technology to its affiliate to produce 
abroad, the affiliate will pay a royalty to the parent. As established in 1984 under Section 367(d) 
of the Internal Revenue Code, transferring an intangible as described above cannot be used as a 
tax-free method of capitalizing a foreign affiliate. Tax legislation in 1986 provides that transferring 
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defer that tax liability  and does not evaluate the possible benefits from re- 
taining income abroad because the source rule issues discussed above are most 
relevant to firms in an excess credit position. 
In the case of the software industry, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
judges that sales of computer-related services by foreign affiliates are by far 
the dominant method of serving foreign markets. In contrast to the exports of 
goods or services from the United States, which were roughly $2 billion each, 
total service sales by affiliates in computer and office equipment manufactur- 
ing and in professional and commercial equipment were $40 billion in 1993 
(Sandheimer and Bargas  1994). Therefore, royalties are likely to be one of 
the primary forms in which this activity appears in U.S. tax and balance-of- 
payments tabulations. 
8.3  Comparisons of Alternative Tax Treatment 
Table 8.1 summarizes the issues discussed above by comparing the after-tax 
return to capital earned under several alternative tax treatments. The stylized 
cases assume that the same revenues are earned from foreign sales in all situa- 
tions. Variable costs of production are assumed to be the same whether produc- 
tion takes place at home or abroad. Two different cases are presented to reflect 
a difference in the relative importance of variable cost as a share of total cost. 
The two  values  chosen, 40  percent  and  65 percent,  represent  differences 
among export industries that can be inferred from Internal Revenue Service 
Table 8.1  After-Tax Returns from Alternative Transactions to Serve the 
Foreign Market 
Case 
Variable Cost/Total  RoyaltiesForeign- 
cost  Source Income 
.40  .65  .40  .20 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Export of goods 
No tariff, no benefits 
Tariff, no benefits 
FSC benefits, excess limit 
Sales source rules, excess credit 
Export of  services 
U.S. taxation 
Affiliate production 
Excess credit, high tax 
Excess credit, low tax 
Excess limit, high tax 
Excess limit, low tax 
9.15  9.15 
8.27  7.20 
8.94  7.80 
10.50  9.16 
9.75  9.15 
9.86  8.64 
13.75  13.45 
9.75  9.75 
9.75  9.15 
Assumprions:  t,, = .35, 7  = .lo. High-tax case: r, = .45, wd = .lo, w,  = .lo; low-tax case: t, = 
.lo,  wd  .025, w, = ,025. 266  John Mutti and Harry Grubert 
(1993  j: in industries such as pharmaceutical drugs the cost of goods sold as a 
share of business  receipts  is represented  by  the 40 percent  figure, while in 
various nonelectrical machinery industries the 65 percent value is observed. 
Assume that the firm finances its spending on tangible and intangible capital 
with equity. The importance of intangible capital can only be approximated in 
rough  terms. The 1989 benchmark  survey of  U.S. direct investment abroad 
reports the relative importance of parent receipts from affiliates of direct in- 
vestment income, royalties, and other direct investment services (US. Depart- 
ment  of Commerce  1992). Royalties may not represent  the entire return  to 
intangible  capital  if  some of the return  appears as higher  direct investment 
earnings (Grubert 1998). Also, receipts for other services (or charges for parent 
headquarter expenses) may represent a source of return comparable to royalties 
in  some sectors,  but  from a tax  perspective  they  represent  U.S.  domestic- 
source income. Those payments are more important in several service sectors, 
including computer and data-processing  services, but they are less important 
in manufacturing.  Two cases are considered, one where intangibles  account 
for 40 percent  of foreign operating income  (before the deduction  of royalty 
payments), and one where they account for 20 percent. 
The U.S.  income tax rate is assumed to be 35 percent.  Operations in two 
different foreign countries are presented,  one with an income tax rate of 45 
percent, to represent a high-tax country such as Japan, and one with an income 
tax rate of 10 percent, to represent low-tax countries such as Singapore, Hong 
Kong, and Ireland. In the high-tax case the dividend and royalty withholding 
rates are both  10 percent,  while in the low-tax  alternative both rates are 2.5 
percent. In both cases the tariff rate imposed on imports from the United States 
is 10 percent. 
First compare the tax consequences of exporting a good versus exporting a 
service. The base case for exports of goods assumes no tariff  and no special 
tax treatment  of export income, and the rate of return is calibrated to be the 
same (9.75 percent) as when a service is exported. The imposition of a tariff 
reduces the net revenues to exporters of goods, making that way of serving the 
foreign market less attra~tive.~  FSC benefits are not sufficient to offset the ef- 
fect of the tariff; when the gross profit margin is small, as in column (2j, even 
applying advantageous  sales source rules for a firm with  excess foreign  tax 
credits results in a lower return. This outcome reflects a relationship familiar 
from the effective protection  literature:  a relatively low tariff  imposed on a 
good where value added accounts for a small share of its price can yield a very 
high effective rate of protection. Because exports of services are not subject to 
foreign tariffs, that form of serving the foreign market may appear more attrac- 
tive, as in column (2). 
The tax consequences from affiliate production abroad depend importantly 
4. This reasoning assumes the firm currently has excess capacity to produce both at home and 
abroad, and a higher tariff creates an incentive to expand foreign production at the given foreign 
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on the foreign tax credit position of the U.S. parent. For a firm in an excess 
credit position the benefit from being able to treat royalties as foreign-source 
income is determined by the importance of intangibles in the firm’s production 
and by the host-country tax rate that is avoided when the royalty is a deductible 
expense. Note in column (3), where high royalties are paid, that the deterrent 
effect of operating in a country with a high income tax rate is offset by  the 
opportunity to pay royalties, which are subject to a low withholding rate. The 
parent benefits from being able to use its excess credits to offset any residual 
U.S. tax due. In column (4) the firm has less intangible income, and the effect 
of  the high foreign income tax rate is not offset by  the opportunity to pay 
royalties. Thus, a high-technology firm that receives more of its return from 
foreign operations in the form of royalties is more likely to gain from operating 
an affiliate in a high-tax host country.s 
In the case of a firm without excess foreign tax credits, a residual tax is due 
in  the United States regardless of  the host-country tax rate or the extent to 
which royalties are paid. Production  in a high-tax country  is not penalized 
because the opportunity to use the additional foreign tax credits generated by 
production there means the U.S. firm does not bear the burden of the higher 
host tax rate. 
If the United States were to treat royalties as domestic-source income, the 
U.S. firm with excess foreign tax credits would not benefit from bringing home 
lightly taxed foreign-source income free from U.S.  tax. The rates  of  return 
previously reported in table 8.1 would drop substantially: for the case of a firm 
paying out a higher share of royalties, returns fall from 9.86 percent to 7.97 
percent in the high-tax host country and from 13.75 percent to 11.70 percent 
in the low-tax host country. Perhaps such a policy shift would give U.S. parents 
an incentive to declare fewer royalties and instead to make larger overhead 
charges for R&D, an item that appears in the BEA category “other direct in- 
vestment services.” While such an entry generally would be regarded as US.- 
source income, it typically has not been subject to a high foreign withholding 
tax. 
The negative effect on US.  firms is not, however, as disadvantageous as if a 
high-tax foreign government did not recognize royalties as deductible business 
expenses. In that situation if the same withholding rate were levied on all pay- 
ments to the parent, then all of the foreign-source income would become sub- 
ject to the higher foreign income tax rate. The rate of return would fall from 
9.86 percent to 6.75 percent. 
In summary, source rules that treat royalties and portions of export income 
as foreign source influence the attractiveness of production at home or abroad. 
5.  This example ignores any requirement that the parent firm  allocate some portion of its U.S. 
R&D expenses against its foreign source income. Section 861 of the Internal Revenue Code ad- 
dresses such allocations, but  its implementation has varied considerably over time. Allocating 
expenses to foreign-source income reduces the size of the foreign tax credit that can be claimed. 
For a parent firm  in an excess credit position the parent’s loss equals the amount of  the allocation 
times the U.S. tax rate. 268  John Mutti and Harry Grubert 
Because services provided to foreigners generally are domestic-source income 
rather than foreign-source income, firms in an excess credit position may find 
it attractive to structure those transactions in another form. Few general pre- 
sumptions emerge because the relative  advantages  of different locations  or 
transactions depend importantly on host-country trade and tax policies, too. 
8.4  Foreign Rules for Sourcing Income 
U.S. firms are also influenced by foreign rules for sourcing income. In the 
case of U.S. exports of goods and services, the purchasing country may claim 
that  some part of the income  earned  is sourced  in that country,  even if  the 
provider has no permanent business establishment there.6 Consider situations 
that involve services, where a host country pays for oil core logs to be analyzed 
or an economic consulting report to be prepared, but the work is done outside 
of the country. In the case of a service provided to a related party, many host- 
country governments will prohibit that party from deducting the payment from 
its foreign taxable income. If the payment is not to a related party, Colombia, 
for example, treats the income as domestic source and subject to Colombian 
income taxation and withholding taxes (McLure et al. 1990). 
When a foreign government claims the right to tax service income, it may 
have no way  of  verifying  what  costs are incurred  in providing  the service. 
Therefore, it may levy a tax on the gross payment to the foreigner. That ap- 
proach  is similar to imposing a withholding  tax on gross interest or royalty 
payments where no attention is paid to expenses incurred in earning that in- 
come. The present example differs from a royalty or interest payment, however, 
because in this case the U.S. government does not recognize that any foreign- 
source income is earned. If the U.S. firm  already is in an excess credit position, 
it can make no use of the additional foreign tax credits generated. In terms of 
the stylized example above, imposing a tax of 9.1 percent on the gross value of 
the service payment would reduce returns by exactly the same amount as the 10 
percent tariff on U.S. exports reported earlier. The penalty on the U.S. producer 
again  arises  because the foreign  tax  is deductible but  not creditable.  For a 
higher foreign tax rate, the provision of services becomes even less attractive. 
Host-country taxation of this income represents a trade barrier that discrimi- 
nates against foreign service providers, since those individuals will also face 
home-country  taxation of what the home country regards as domestic-source 
income. Are there circumstances, however, in which this treatment will have 
the same neutral effect on trade that arises under the destination principle of 
border tax adjustment that is applied to indirect taxes? 
Under that principle, an indirect tax is imposed on imports and rebated on 
exports. As shown by various authors (Baldwin  1970; Feldstein and Krugman 
6.  Tax laws provide no consistent rationale for determining the source of income in such situa- 
tions. E.g., in the insurance industry income usually is attributed to the country in which the in- 
sured risk is located, even though the actuaries who evaluate the risk or the individuals who bear 
the risk are located elsewhere. 269  The Significance of  International Tax  Rules for Sourcing Income 
1990) the goal of such border tax adjustment is to leave unaltered the relative 
prices of domestic and foreign goods both in the home market and in foreign 
markets. Suppose domestic prices in countries A and B are initially the same 
before the imposition of an indirect tax by country A. The price of the domestic 
good becomes Pa(l + t), and under a destination principle that imposes the 
same tax on imports, the price of the foreign good becomes P,( 1 + r). Relative 
prices do not change. Similarly, the price of foreign goods remains P,  in other 
markets, and when country A rebates the tax on exports, its price remains Pa. 
Again, relative prices do not change. To impose an indirect tax in order to 
be able to gain the benefit of destination principle treatment misinterprets the 
consequences of making border tax adjustments and mistakenly infers there is 
some benefit available. 
A uniform value-added tax levied on all goods has the same economic effect 
as a general income tax levied on  all income. Making the same border tax 
adjustment for both taxes would call for imposing the income tax on imports 
and rebating it on exports. Therefore, the distorting effect of the service tax 
described above arises not because it is imposed on imports but because it is 
not rebated on exports. 
Note that the tax in the service example is an income tax on an individual 
or corporation, not an indirect tax on computer programs or consulting reports. 
Therefore, it does not fall within the standard conditions for border tax adjust- 
ment under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Historically, 
the GATT has not allowed rebates of direct taxes at the border, and in fact a 
GATT panel ruled against the U.S. DISC (domestic international sales corpora- 
tion) program on the grounds that it effectively taxed export income at a lower 
rate than domestic income and therefore represented an export subsidy. 
The new General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is a possible fo- 
rum to address issues of double taxation or border tax adjustments applied to 
direct taxes. In the Uruguay  Round negotiations  the United  States strongly 
opposed such a move (Matthews 1995). Without considering the precise ratio- 
nale for the U.S. position, recognize there are significant administrative issues 
to address in verifying what income taxes have been paid in the production of 
a particular product. Another reason for caution in introducing this issue before 
the GATS may the existence of ambiguities in the application of the national 
treatment standard to income tax systems. Determining what constitutes com- 
parable treatment can be difficult. For example, would levying a withholding 
tax on foreigners in lieu of imposing an income tax on them be construed as 
resulting in a heavier burden on some foreigners in some years? 
8.5  Foreign-Source Income, Taxation, and Firm Response 
How important are the incentives created by the two source rules identified 
above? To  address that question, first consider several general measures that 
indicate the relative  importance  of  various  items of foreign-source  income. 
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warranted because it is used in calculating the foreign tax credit limitation 
relevant to royalties and allocated export income. A related issue is the likeli- 
hood that a firm will have a potential excess of foreign tax credits and thereby 
benefit from these  two source rules. Based  on  data from  1990, foreign tax 
credit positions across industries are reported. Finally, efforts to evaluate the 
effects on firm behavior of the sales source rules and the treatment of royalties 
are discussed. 
8.5.1  The Importance of Active Business Income 
Table 8.2 provides a summary of several balance-of-payments  entries for 
investment income and for other payments  among affiliated enterprises. In 
spite of the widely reported surge in portfolio investment as individual savers 
have bought shares of  stock in foreign companies and mutual funds, direct 
investment receipts are substantial and have risen more rapidly than other pri- 
vate receipts over the decade from 1986 to 1996. Therefore, source rules that 
govern the calculation of the foreign tax credit limitation for US.  multinational 
corporations can have quantitatively significant economic effects. 
Royalties grew particularly  rapidly between  1986 and  1990, and by  1996 
they nearly equaled $30 billion. Over three-fourths of U.S. receipts come from 
affiliates rather than unrelated parties. That arrangement is not surprising be- 
cause two unrelated parties may not easily predict or agree on the future profits 
likely to be generated by an intangible. Affiliation avoids the need to make that 
sort of forecast. Changes in the tax law discussed above may have given U.S. 
firms a greater incentive to receive royalties, too. Receipts from other private 
services are a much larger number than royalties, and from 1990 to 1996 they 
have grown slightly more rapidly than royalties. In contrast to royalties, how- 
ever, less than 30 percent are accounted for by receipts from affiliates. 
These figures are not directly equivalent to items that appear in the general 
basket for calculating the foreign income tax limitation. First, only the portion 
of  direct investment earnings repatriated to the United  States is subject to a 
residual U.S. tax or relevant in determining the foreign tax credit limitation. 
Second, not all foreign-source income declared by U.S. taxpayers appears in 
the general basket, and therefore it may not be combined with royalties and 
export income in calculating the foreign tax credit limitation. 
With respect to the first point, table 8.2 contains the BEA measure of distrib- 
uted earnings. The corresponding payout ratio shows considerable variation: it 
exceeds 70 percent in 1986, 1988, and 1989, but it is less than 40 percent in 
1995 and 1996.’ Predicting future behavior is not straightforward. 
7. The BEA series reflects the new convention adopted in 1992 to exclude unrealized capital 
gains from retained  earnings and total earnings. The high payout ratio  in  1986 may reflect  the 
desire to repatriate more highly taxed  foreign-source income in order to combine  it with other 
income subject to low foreign taxes that subsequently would be treated  in separate baskets. For 
general discussion of the determinants of dividend remittances, including nontax factors such as 
the potential importance of foreign investment opportunities or parent financial requirements, see 
Hines and Hubbard (1990) and Altshuler and Newlon (1993). Table 8.2  Investment Income and Related Service Flows: United States, 1984-96 
Category  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
Income receipts 



















































































































































Sources: Michael Mann, Daniel Atherton, Laura Brokenbaugh, Sylvia Bargas, “U.S. International Sales and Purchases of Private Services,” Survey of  Current Business 
76 (November 1996): 70-1  12; Christopher Bach, “U.S. International Transactions, Revised Estimates for 1974-96,”  Survey of  Current Business  77 (July  1997): 
43-99;  and unpublished information from the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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With respect to the second point, data reported by the Internal Revenue Ser- 
vice are useful in interpreting the general picture derived from BEA data, even 
though the calendar-year definitions are not the same. Foreign-source income 
declared by corporations claiming a foreign tax credit in  1990 was $99.6 bil- 
lion, while deferred income retained abroad was $34.9 billion. Active foreign- 
source income reported in the general basket was $73.6 billion; the foreign tax 
credit limitation was $24.7 billion and the foreign tax credit claimed was $22.6 
billion,  leaving a residual U.S. tax liability of  $2.1 billion. Part of the $99.6 
billion received by U.S. corporations was passive foreign-source income (such 
as interest received), and another part was financial service income. These sep- 
arate categories of income may be subject to a higher residual rate of U.S. 
taxation because they cannot be combined with other foreign-source income 
that has been  subject to a high foreign rate of taxation. For example, in the 
case of passive income of $4.3 billion, the foreign tax credit limitation was 
$1.462 billion and the foreign tax credit claimed was $385 million; these fig- 
ures imply  an effective foreign income tax rate of  9 percent. In the case of 
financial  service income,  the corresponding  numbers were  a $2.432 billion 
limitation, a $1.536 billion foreign tax credit claimed, and an effective foreign 
tax rate of 21.5 percent. 
The total foreign tax credit limitation  for all corporate income was $29.6 
billion, and the foreign tax credit claimed was $25.0 billion. The items in the 
general basket cited above account for a large share of the U.S. tax liability 
on foreign-source income (83 percent) but a smaller share of the residual tax 
collected by  the U.S.  government  after  allowing for foreign tax credits  (43 
percent). While other items are important from the standpoint of tax adminis- 
tration, the incentives examined in this paper apply to a significant part of U.S. 
activity abroad. 
8.5.2  The Excess Credit Position of U.S. Parent Firms 
By reducing the U.S.  statutory tax  rate  and establishing  separate income 
baskets to calculate the foreign tax credit limitation, the Tax  Reform Act of 
1986 made it much more likely that U.S. parent firms would be in excess credit 
positions with respect to income in the general basket. Tax return data analyzed 
by Altshuler and Newlon (1993) from the set of U.S. companies with positive 
foreign-source income indicate that the percentage of income reported by firms 
in excess credit posiiions was 35 percent in 1982 and 42 percent in 1984. The 
postreform figure for 1990 shows that 65 percent of the income declared in the 
general basket was  by firms  with excess foreign tax credits. Therefore, a much 
wider set of firms can benefit from favorable source rules than was true a de- 
cade earlier. Whether this figure declines in the future depends in part on how 
costly firms find it to shift income or operations out of high-tax countries or 
whether  foreign  countries  reduce  their  tax  rates  in  competition  with  the 
United States. 
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source income vanes considerably across industries. Based on 1990 data table 
8.3 shows the amount of foreign-source income declared by industry and the 
extent to which aggregate tax payments exceeded the foreign tax credit limita- 
tion for firms in the industry. Column  (3) shows the percentage  of foreign- 
source income accounted for by firms in an excess credit position, and column 
(4) presents the average effective tax rate on active foreign-source income. 
Note the unique position of the office and computing machinery industry. 
Not only does it account for nearly half of all the excess credits reported by 
nonpetroleum  manufacturing parents, but the proportion of industry income 
accounted for by  firms with excess credits exceeds 95 percent. That industry, 
however, should not be regarded as typical of all high-technology industries 
where returns to intangibles are an important part of total revenue. Other high- 
technology  industries such as drugs and electronics owe a residual U.S. tax. 
Some industries may be more reliant on production and sales in high-tax coun- 
tries, while other industries are more footloose and can locate production in 
low-tax  countries but still serve high-tax markets. Furthermore,  the average 
effective tax rate is an endogenous variable, determined by the mix of repatri- 
ated income subject to different  tax rates, and  some industries  may have a 
lower cost of adjusting the form of their repatriations in order to reduce their 
overall tax burden. 
The Altshuler-Newlon study also reports the likelihood that a firm’s foreign 
tax credit position changes from excess credit to excess limit or vice versa. 
Comparing  1980 to  1982 and then  1982 to 1984, they find that 52.4 percent 
and then 58.1 percent of income was reported by firms whose tax credit posi- 
tions did not shift. That leaves a significant share of firms whose positions did 
shift, perhaps due to exogenous changes in policy or to random shocks over 
the business cycle or to tax-motivated adjustments by the firm. While a firm 
might have less incentive to alter its exports or foreign production if an excess 
credit position were only transitory, how should observed shifts in the firm’s 
foreign tax credit position be interpreted? Knowing a firm’s expected or more 
permanent  ex ante foreign tax credit position  would allow a more accurate 
assessment of the role of taxes. Altshuler and Newlon create such a proxy in 
their study of  multinational repatriation practices, a good precedent for other 
work. If firms assign a high probability to having excess credits, even firms in 
excess limit will respond to the source rule incentives discussed above. 
8.5.3  The Sales Source Rules 
The sales source rules do not provide a neutral incentive to all U.S. export- 
ers. Rather, the incentive only arises when the firm is a multinational corpora- 
tion with foreign affiliate operations that generate excess foreign tax credits. 
The greater the profit rate per dollar of sales, the greater the benefit to multina- 
tional exports. Because such multinational corporations also may pay high roy- 
alties, however, they may not consider sales source rule benefits to be the most 
desirable strategy to absorb foreign tax credits. Table 8.3  Excess Credit Positions of US.  Corporations, 1990 
Industry 
Foreign Source  Share of  Income Reported  Average Effective Foreign 
Income  Excess Credit  by Firms in Excess Credit  Tax Rate 








Office and computing machinery 
Other nonelectrical machinery 
Electrical machinery and electronics 
Motor vehicles 
Other transport equipment 
Instruments 
Other manufacturing 





























































Source: US. Department of the Treasury, Office of  Tax Analysis, unpublished information 
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Rousslang’s review of the sales source rules provides direct observation of 
which firms actually claimed these benefits. Thirty-six percent of the allocated 
export income was claimed by firms in excess credit positions, although those 
firms  accounted  for  73 percent  of  the  tax  saving.  By  claiming  additional 
foreign-source export income, many firms converted their position from one 
of potential  excess credits to one of  excess limit.  Industries that gained an 
above average tax benefit, measured  as a share of export sales, appear to be 
paper and publishing, drugs and toiletries, office and computing machinery, 
electrical machinery and electronics, and instruments.8 Note that this list in- 
cludes the three manufacturing industries in table 8.3 that were not in excess 
credit in  1990. In those industries the tax incentive to expand exports further 
is much smaller on average. 
Rousslang projects the potential effect of the sales source rules by calculat- 
ing the marginal reduction in the cost of  capital from this tax benefit, mul- 
tiplying  the  resultant  price  effect by  the relevant  export demand elasticity, 
and finally allowing for subsequent adjustment of the exchange rate. Such a 
procedure is standard practice when the effect of a tax policy change is difficult 
to disentangle from other influences, although its accuracy depends on the ap- 
propriate elasticities being known. 
If  the experience of  individual firms were to be evaluated to verify such 
projections, what effects would demonstrate the influence of the sales source 
rules? One possibility is that the tax benefit from exporting would cause the 
U.S. parent to serve foreign markets by greater export production rather than 
affiliate production abroad. Under that scenario the ratio of exports to affiliate 
sales is likely to rise, especially if the foreign market is fixed in size and greater 
exports necessarily  cause a reduction  in affiliate  sales. Another  possibility, 
however, is suggested by a complementary relationship between exports and 
affiliate sales (Lipsey and Weiss 1981; Grubert and Mutti 1991). In this situa- 
tion, a U.S. export may be an input with few close substitutes in foreign pro- 
duction, but the output produced abroad may be sold in markets where there 
are many substitutes available. Thus, a lower tax on U.S.  exports or a lower tax 
on foreign profits both promote exports and affiliate sales. Where output will 
be affected most cannot be predicted a priori when affiliate sales represent a 
mixture of  sales in a protected home market and in more competitive world 
markets. 
For example, in a regression to explain  the ratio of US. exports to total 
affiliate sales, based on the Commerce Department’s 1982 benchmark survey 
of direct investment abroad used in Grubert and Mutti (1991), a higher foreign 
corporate income tax rate reduces the export share: 
8. This calculation is based on Rousslang’s figure for the foreign tax credits absorbed in each 
industry divided by U.S. multinational exports in that industry, as reported in U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1992). 276  John Mutti and Harry Grubert 
ln[Exports/Affiliated sales] = 12.69 + 4.37  ln(1 + Tax) - .17 In GDP 
(2.42)  (3.19)  (-.86) 
-  .64  Tradebarrier 
(-2.06) 
- 1.02  In  GDP/Capita + 2.06  Transport, 
(-2.27)  (1.69) 
&,?,  = 4.69,  R2 = .37 
where Tax is the host-country corporate tax rate, Trade barrier is a World Bank 
categorization  of  progressively  more  restrictive  host  country  trade  policy, 
Transport is a dummy for sales within North America, and the numbers in 
parentheses are t-statistics. The regression also appears credible in demonstra- 
ting that exports will be lower where trade barriers are higher and where pro- 
duction in the host country is more likely due to a larger market and higher 
labor productivity. Using the next available benchmark survey for 1989 for the 
same set of  countries, however, the tax coefficient is insignificant. That out- 
come does not indicate that taxes are unimportant but only that there is not a 
differential effect on exports and affiliate sales. 
This distinction can be seen by considering the two separate demand equa- 
tions: 
ln(Exports)  = a,  + a,  ln(1 - Tax) + a?  In  GDP +  . . ', 
ln(Affi1iate sales)  = 6, + h,  ln(1 - Tax) + b2  In  GDP +  .  ., 
and then subtracting the second from the first to give 
ln(Exports/ Affiliate sales) = (a, - b,)  + (a, - b,)ln(l - Tax) 
+ (a2 - b,)ln  GDP t 
In 1989 higher foreign corporate income taxes still have a negative effect on 
affiliate sales (a statistically significant estimate of h,),  but the effect on exports 
is too imprecisely estimated for the difference between the two to be signifi- 
cant. 
Kemsley (1 995) relies on a similar ratio approach to assess the sales source 
rules, but he obtains different results. Based on a time-series analysis of Com- 
pustat data for individual firms he identifies two trends in the post- 1986 period: 
exports relative to affiliate sales have risen, and a larger share of firms appear to 
be in excess credit positions. He estimates that firms in excess credit positions 
account for this increased reliance on exports to serve foreign markets. Average 
export sales in his sample are $80 million per firm, and he projects that in the 
absence of the sales source benefits a firm would export $70 million less. 
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products they make, the country markets they serve, and the tax rates appli- 
cable in those markets. For example, exporters may successfully develop mar- 
kets in high-tax countries, but their sales may be more attributable to tastes or 
income levels in those countries than to tax factors. Therefore, Kemsley also 
estimates an aggregate cross-sectional relationship similar to the one reported 
above.9  He again reports a strong effect from the sales source rules: in countries 
with higher tax rates a larger share of the market is served by exports and this 
relationship is more pronounced in 1989 than in 1982.’O Because the causation 
in this relationship still is ambiguous, it is premature to claim a precise mea- 
sure of the sales source rules’ effectiveness. 
8.5.4  Royalties as Foreign-Source Income 
Royalty receipts are much larger than allocated export income under the 
sales source rules, and at least in absolute terms a greater influence on multina- 
tional operations can be expected. By paying royalties a firm  can increase its 
after-tax return from operating in high-tax countries. The tax saving is greater 
for firms that would be in excess credit than for those in excess limit. Under 
what circumstances will this tax saving affect the location of real economic ac- 
tivity? 
If the foreign market can only be served by  affiliate production and if the 
technology developed for the home market can be costlessly applied to produc- 
9. By looking at two different benchmark years, Kemsley explicitly considers changes in the 
In(Exports)  =  a, + a,  In { + a2 In  f  + u3  In  GDP +  ..., 
In(Affi1iate sales)  =  b,  + b,  In  4  + b,  In  f  + b3  In  GDP +  ..., 
cost of exporting from the United States. The two demand equations become 
where Px  represents the price of exporting from the United States, which is affected by the US. 
tax rate on export income, and P,  represents the price of affiliate production in the foreign country, 
which is affected by the host-country tax rate for firms in excess credit. If changes in export and 
foreign prices are presumed to have symmetric effects, then the ratio of export to affiliate sales 
appears as 
In(Exports / Affiliate sales)  =  (a, - b,)  +  e  In({  / f)  + (a, - b,)ln  GDP 
where the elasticity of substitution, e,  requires that a, + uz = b, + b,, a testable constraint from 
parameters estimated in the two separate demand equations (Learner and Stem 1970). 
10. The dominance of the substitution effect in Kemsley’s sample of firms may be attributable 
to a different conceptual measure, aside from the difference in data source and time frame: by 
focusing only on multinational exports to unrelated parties, which thereby excludes 43 percent of 
multinational exports, possible complementarities between U.S. and foreign production are less 
likely to be observed. In the cross-sectional study, treating only the ratio between exports and 
affiliate sales may obscure the causal relationship involved. For example, affiliate production may 
be lower in countries with high tax rates, which would cause the ratio of exports to affiliate sales 
to rise even in the absence of a separate effect on exports from the sales source rules. Because 
Kemsley does not report separate export and affiliate demand estimates, or the corresponding sepa- 
rability tests noted above, reasons why his results differ from Grubert and Mutti cannot be clearly 
identified. Possible explanations are differences in the definition of the tax variable (average effec- 
tive tax rates vs. statutory tax rates) and differences in the set of countries included in the analysis. 278  John Mutti and Harry Grubert 
tion in the foreign market, then the royalty represents a pure rent. A change in 
the tax  treatment of the royalty  merely  changes  the distribution  of  the rent 
without altering the firm’s operations in the country. If the firm can exploit the 
technology elsewhere and still serve the same foreign market, however, favor- 
able tax treatment of the royalty can alter the incentive to produce in a country. 
In particular, treating royalties as foreign-source income reduces the disadvan- 
tage of producing in a high-tax  country where the cost of equity-financed in- 
vestment otherwise is higher. 
Two relationships are relevant in assessing the empirical response to this tax 
incentive. One is the tendency for firms to pay larger royalties from high-tax 
locations. Aggregate data from the  1989 benchmark survey  show this effect 
quite strongly, for various representations of royalty payments as the dependent 
variable and for various potentially relevant tax effects. The relevant tax vari- 
able is somewhat ambiguous because the tax price of paying a royalty depends 
on the foreign tax credit position of the parent and the alternative forgone (re- 
taining income abroad, paying a dividend, paying interest, etc.). Also, if royal- 
ties are represented relative to assets or sales, the foreign tax rate influences 
the denominator as well, implying a different functional form. 
Estimates based on the aggregate data used above for all affiliates in a host 
country give the following results: 
Royalty/sales  = .009 - .040 wr - .028 ln(1 - t),  &,2,  = 8.50, R’  = .34; 
(2.38) (-3.28)  (-2.48) 
Royalty/sales  = .010 - .040w, + .032 t, &, = 7.12,  R’  = .30; 
(2.18) (-3.19)  (-2.01) 
Royalty/sales  = .017 - ,038 wr - .0006 t - ,083 High  + .23 High*t, 
(4.40) (-3.99)  (-.37)  (-3.74)  (4.3  1) 
&5  = 11.89,  R2 = .60; 
where wT  is the withholding rate imposed on royalties, t is the effective income 
tax rate, High is a dummy equal to one for those countries where the effective 
tax rate exceeds 0.34, and the term High * t multiplies this dummy by the tax 
rate. Royalties  as a share of affiliate  sales are larger in countries where the 
foreign income tax rate is higher and the royalty withholding rate is lower. The 
final equation suggests that firms operating in countries where the foreign tax 
rate exceeds the U.S.  rate are particularly  likely  to be those that can adopt 
the strategy of paying higher royalties. This relationship is demonstrated more 
completely in an analysis of firm-specific data by Grubert (1998), which con- 
trols for firm characteristics such as R&D expenditures and also treats other 
repatriation decisions the firm makes. 
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Using firm-specific tax return data for 1990, Grubert and Mutti (1995) found 
that probit estimates of the likelihood of a firm’s locating in a given country 
were quite sensitive to the host-country corporate income tax rate. The size of 
this deterrent tax effect fell by roughly 20 percent when  a variable was in- 
cluded that interacted the relevant tax rate with a firm’s expenditure on research 
and development per dollar of assets. That is, the opportunity to pay royalties 
is greater for companies that have larger stocks of intangible, intellectual prop- 
erty (represented by research  and development expenditures), and firms that 
can pay higher royalties face less of a penalty operating in high-tax countries. 
The empirical estimates from  1990 data suggest that the opportunity to treat 
royalties as foreign-source income does encourage investment in high-tax loca- 
tions. Subsequent analysis based on 1992 data, however, did not find this rela- 
tionship to be significant. Establishing the robustness of potential effects of 
source rules on the location of real activity apparently will require additional 
data and analysis. 
8.6  Conclusions 
This paper extends an earlier literature by Horst (  197  1 ) and others from the 
1970s that demonstrated how low tax rates and the opportunity to defer the 
repatriation of foreign income created an incentive to locate production abroad 
rather than export from the United States. The focus here is on a different set 
of  tax provisions that also may influence the location of production internation- 
ally. Rather than analyze the level of foreign tax rates, however, the paper eval- 
uates U.S. rules for sourcing income, a determination that is important in cal- 
culating the  foreign  tax  credit  limitation. These source  rules  have  become 
increasingly important because a much larger proportion of the income earned 
abroad by  U.S. exporters and by U.S. subsidiaries is reported by parents in 
excess foreign tax credit positions. 
The ability to characterize income as foreign source is especially beneficial 
to firms with excess credits because  income that is subject to little taxation 
abroad also may be free of U.S. taxation. The stylized examples demonstrate 
that while the effects of these provisions are not as transparent as the effects 
of statutory tax rates, they create significant incentives to report taxable income 
in  certain  forms.  The  sales  source  rules  provide  an  important  benefit  by 
allowing roughly half of export income to be regarded as foreign source. Treat- 
ing royalties as foreign source may provide an even greater benefit to affiliate 
production, though, since royalties reduce the affiliate’s foreign tax burden and 
may create no U.S. tax liability when the parent is in an excess credit position. 
That potentially large effects on firm profits lead to large changes in real eco- 
nomic activity cannot be conclusively  demonstrated. Tentative evidence sug- 
gests that U.S. exports increase as a result of the sales source rules, and foreign 
production in high-tax locations is encouraged by treating royalties as foreign- 
source income. 280  John Mutti and Harry Grubert 
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Comment  Kristen L. Willard 
One of the persistent questions in international economic research is, Why do 
some firms choose to develop multinational production facilities while others 
expand internationally through direct export or licensing arrangements? De- 
spite decades of research into the issue, the profession has arrived at few un- 
equivocal conclusions. Rather, we have learned that the organization of a firm’s 
global expansion efforts may be influenced by many competing factors, includ- 
ing but not limited to standard international trade issues, such as comparative 
advantage and tariffs; standard industrial organization issues, such as market 
concentration; and of course taxes. Indeed, the explicit question of the extent 
to which tax burdens may affect the location of investment has received an 
increasing amount of attention in the wake of the 1986 tax reform. (See Hines 
1996 for a review of the literature.) 
This paper contributes to the discussion of the relationship between tax pol- 
icy and multinational production decisions in two important ways. First, in the 
tradition of Ault and Bradford (1990), this paper documents the rules govern- 
ing the sourcing of foreign income for U.S. corporations, providing a much 
needed resource on such complications as the use of foreign sales corporations, 
sales source rules for recharacterizing  export income as foreign source, and 
the treatment of royalty income. 
Through the use of  the extended example of  the U.S. computer industry 
selling computing services abroad, the reader can see the conflicting incentives 
inherent in the source rules. Moreover, it also becomes clear that firms able to 
easily recharacterize the nature of a transaction-for  example, from a product 
export to service income-may  avoid taxation in a manner unintended by poli- 
cymakers. This may be particularly relevant in technology-intensive industries: 
the sale of  computer software may be indistinguishable from the provision of 
some computer service, from the clients’ perspective. However, since tariffs 
are rarely  imposed  on  service provision,  this recharacterization  gives  new 
meaning to the idea of tariff jumping. 
The second contribution of the paper is that the authors provide some com- 
parisons of  the likely magnitude of  incentive effects from various combina- 
tions of these rules and in so doing generate some empirically testable implica- 
tions of  source rules on investment. For instance, higher foreign tariff rates 
discourage U.S. production relative to licensing or investment in foreign pro- 
duction capacity; hence, reductions in foreign tariff rates should increase do- 
mestic production, all else equal. In addition, for excess credit firms, affiliate 
production when royalties can be classified as foreign-source income is partic- 
ularly attractive in low-tax locations. Finally, since the value of the tax incen- 
tives are closely tied to the domestic tax rate, researchers may be able to mea- 
Kristen L. Willard is assistant professor of finance and economics at Columbia University Grad- 
uate School of Business. 282  John Mutti and Harry Grubert 
sure the sensitivity of firms to these incentives by considering individual firm 
reliance on various methods of global expansion and production before and 
after changes in the U.S. tax rate, as happened in 1986. 
In using these benchmark numbers to generate empirical implications, the 
reader should be aware that the authors make some incidence assumptions. For 
instance, in calculating the residual profit from exporting goods subject to an 
import tariff, the authors have implicitly assumed that consumers in the foreign 
market bear the full burden of the tariff. This is a reasonable assumption only 
insofar as the good in question is provided by  a firm in a competitive market. 
The incidence of import tariffs imposed on the product of firms with significant 
market power is likely to be substantially different, requiring a revision of the 
return calculation. Since intraindustry trade between oligopolies is an increas- 
ingly important aspect of international trade flows, this incidence assumption 
needs to be considered carefully by researchers confronting data having de- 
rived testable implications from the relative returns calculations presented by 
the authors. 
Unfortunately, this work is not as broadly applicable as the researcher inter- 
ested in international tax policies might guess given the title of section 8.1: 
“Basic Approaches in Taxing Foreign-Source Income.” The paper does not, as 
that  phrase  implies,  attempt  to  review  the  range  of  approaches  to taxing 
foreign-source income around the globe. Rather, the paper is a more narrowly 
focused exploration of the U.S. system of sourcing rules. Since few other coun- 
tries have similar rules, researchers must be careful not to extrapolate too much 
from U.S. experience, summarized so nicely here, for the differences typically 
extend beyond the details of tax rates. Fully one-third of the countries in the 
world impose taxes  only on income derived from local activities (so-called 
territorial taxation). Because foreign-source income plays no role in local tax 
collections, these countries experience no distortions or complications arising 
from necessarily arbitrary definitions (Hines and Willard 1994). 
Even among those countries that do tax worldwide income of their residents, 
the U.S. practice of defining  foreign-source  income appears  atypical. Japan 
and the United Kingdom, for instance, allow host-country  definitions of in- 
come to prevail for their multinational firms. This U.S.-centric view of taxation 
is notable, for instance, in the discussion of host-country taxation of service 
income. Mutti and Grubert argue that this type of income taxation amounts to 
a trade barrier because “those individuals will also face home-country taxation 
of what the home country regards as domestic-source income.” This conflict 
will clearly never arise for countries that allow host-country definitions to pre- 
vail in determining the source of income. 
Nevertheless, with this caveat in mind, the paper by Mutti and Grubert pro- 
vides a good stepping-off point for understanding the U.S. approach to foreign- 
source income and gives the reader a good understanding of the marginal deci- 
sions that can be distorted by policy rules defining the source of  income. 283  The Significance of International Tax Rules for Sourcing Income 
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